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NSC BRIEFING

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6 May 1954

CURRENT SITUATION FRENCH MOROCCO

I. Worsening Indo-China situation affects

North Africa:

A. Most serious in French Morocco.

Nationalists will exert greater efforts
obtain independence; French more
determined than ever maintain hold.

II. Anti-US sentiment increasing:

A. Growing tendency nationalists to link
US to French colonial policy, but

B. Terrorist attacks ~~though shifted to~~
French, not yet ~~directed~~ US airbases or
Americans.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HP-702

① 1950

III. Anti-French Terrorism:

A. No let-up eight months despite vigorous
French counter action.

1. Assassination, bombings, arson,
railroad and communications sabotage.

2. Average one attack daily.

B. Recent shift attacks:

1. From pro-French Moroccans to French
nationals.

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2. From urban to rural areas.

C. French relying strong police action.

D. Reinforced by new passive resistance movement:

1. Began April as show of nationalist strength, but has economic overtones.

2. Aimed French monopolies; bans on tobacco, bread; expected extend milk and sugar. Women required wear garb lesser yardage.

3. Ban Moroccans use of modern machinery on penalty crops burned.

4. Response immediate in Casablanca; spread Rabat, Tangier.

IV. Basis anti-French resistance:

A. Incompatibility nationalist desire independence with French determination maintain perhaps expand control.

B. Erupted Aug 1953 with deposition of popular pro-nationalist sultan.

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C. French "reforms", opposed by ex-sultan

approved by successor.

1. Strip sultanate remaining power.
2. Extend French control.

V. Prospects not good:

A. French lost contact friendly elements.

Formerly pro-French Moroccans are now critical of French policy.

B. Positions hardened both sides. Mutual distrust. Nationalists sceptical any concessions by French.

C. Nationalists probably not settle short public promise independence with definite timetable and immediate steps autonomy.

Change of sultans alone not enough.

D. French probably unable make real concessions: Prestige factors; strategic values, including source manpower.

Strong opposition any concessions from small but influential local French community.

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